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Introduction
Since the tragic division of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea has been continually the main target of North Korea's diverse threats. 1 The seriousness of the North Korean threat became apparent with the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan and the artillery attack on Yeonpyong Island in 2010. There remains a high possibility of additional North Korean military provocations designed to relieve internal problems related to a power struggle.
After the death of Kim Jong-il, the political situation in North Korea became increasingly unstable as power transferred to Kim Jong-un. There has been a growing concern about the chaotic aftermath of a regime collapse in the North. General James D. Thurman, the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, stated in his Senate Armed Services Committee confirmation hearing that South Korea and the United States should prepare to cope with the complexity of North Korea's possible regime collapse. 2 Under these circumstances, South Korea needs to look ahead to the problems it may face and prepare to counter any North Korean insurgency that might result from the expansion of conflicts between political power groups. 3 A collapse in the North has a high possibility of triggering massive civilian defections to South Korea or China, which could lead to the mass murder of civilians by a new power group attempting to control the Northern population. As a result, there would be an increased likelihood of a humanitarian crisis and social disorder due to the emergence of multiple armed groups. The mass confusion in North Korea also 1 The term South Korea refers to the Republic of South Korea in this study. In all places where the word North Korea is used it means the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 2 General Thurman stressed that "the U.S.-South Korea Combined Forces Command must continue readiness preparations to fight and win a war with North Korea and at the same time prepare to deal with the complexity of a regime collapse and the attendant consequences." In The Korea Times, "General Thurman urges preparation for North Korea regime collapse," (20 June, 2011) . http://www.koreatimes.co.kr /www/news/nation/ 2011/06/113_89816.html (accessed 21 July, 2011). would deteriorate the security situation within and beyond the Korean Peninsula. Thus, South Korea needs to consider humanitarian intervention to protect civilians from the violation of human rights and to prevent the expansion of insecurity in the region due to WMDs in particular.
The South's intervention would presumably trigger a Northern insurgency led with armed groups resisting reunification by the South.
North Korea is a hybrid threat with nuclear weapons, approximately 200,000 Special Forces, and a large number of conventional forces. 4 The threat this poses to South Korea in the event of the rogue regime's collapse would be extremely complex and dangerous. Moreover, the interaction of North Korea's political, social, and economic spheres would unpredictably increase the complexity in the operational environment and make more difficult the identification of solutions to the nation's problems. In this regard, South Korea first needs to grasp T.E.
Lawrence's aphorism that "Making war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife." 5 That is, there needs to be an understanding of how major operations and counterinsurgency (COIN) differ in nature. 6 One concern is that superior conventional capability does not necessarily guarantee superiority in COIN operations.
7
Within this context, South Korea still lacks a sufficient operational approach to conducting a COIN campaign despite its increased conventional capability and counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorism experience. 8 Accordingly, the findings of this study include recommendations for improving South Korea's COIN operations. Meeting the requirements for COIN could potentially establish conditions for better stability on the Korean Peninsula and avoid the mistakes South Koreans made before the Korean War. History shows that the South was not prepared to counter the invasion by North Korea even though indications of turmoil on the Peninsula were revealed through the spread of insurgency sparked in the Jeju islands.
The foundation of this monograph is the premise that a regime collapse in the North is likely, and that the South will be involved in COIN operations on the Peninsula. Moreover, there currently appear to be operational shortfalls in the knowledge, planning, and potential execution of COIN within the South Korean military. This monograph raises one primary and three secondary questions. The primary research question: "How can the South Korean military improve its capacity to conduct counterinsurgency in a complex environment?" Answering this primary research question determines how the South Korean army can effectively address insurgents armed with hybrid threats from the North. To do so, this study uses the U.S.
Department of Defense's capabilities organization construct referred to as DOTMLPF, consisting of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.
DOTMLPF, as a problem-solving construct, provides a tool to collect all of the potential solutions for each of the gaps identified by assessing current capabilities and desired capabilities.
9 8 The definition of irregular warfare, guerrilla tactics, and terrorism tactics helps to clarify the relations between the terms and insurgency. "Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and non state actors for legitimacy and influence over a population. This broad form of conflict has insurgency, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare as the principal activities." FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008), 2-10. Guerrilla tactics feature "hit-andrun attacks by lightly armed groups. Insurgents using guerrilla tactics usually avoid decisive confrontations unless they know they can win." Terrorist tactics employ "violence primarily against noncombatants. It can be effective for generating popular support and altering the behavior of governments." Guerrilla and terrorist tactics are tactics of insurgency. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] This monograph examines solutions for the South Korean military within three of these commodity areas: doctrine, organization, and leadership and education. Moreover, it applies the Capability-Based-Assessment (CBA) process model to answer the above three questions.
10 "The CBA is the analytic basis of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
used by the U.S. Department of Defense. It includes a three-phased process: Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), and Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA).
These phases identify conditions-based capability requirements, capability shortfalls when comparing existing capabilities to requirements, and non-material or material approaches to address those gaps, respectively."
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There are three secondary research questions that aim to determine areas where South Korea's counterinsurgency might be improved.
• the South Korean Army will conduct COIN operations. Once the character of the insurgency is defined, then the lists of missions and capabilities for dealing with this operational environment, as well as the conditions and standards for success for the South's counterinsurgency efforts, will become apparent. Answering Question 2 will identify the capabilities the South Korean Army currently possesses or lacks. It is especially helpful for identifying capability gaps. Question 3 provides Doctrine, Organization, and Leadership and Education solutions that will help to mitigate the gaps in South Korea's future COIN operations. Doctrinal viewpoints seek to forge the concept and methodology of operational art and design in terms of "Learn and Adapt."
Organizational views pursue unity of efforts among the armed services and other agencies through a comprehensive South Korean interagency COIN operation. Finally, the leadership aspect focuses on the application of mission command from a perspective of outmaneuvering the insurgency within a required period. The monograph argues that the operational environment on the Korean Peninsula may demand a campaign to counter a North Korean insurgency armed with hybrid threats and that COIN and operational art provide the best approach to managing such a conflict. Thus, this monograph analyzes the strategic context that South Korea may face and seeks to identify required capabilities, distill imperatives for Korea's COIN environment, and determine the requirements for Korea's COIN operations.
Theoretical Foundations: COIN and Operational Art
Knowledge of the theoretical and doctrinal foundations would be beneficial for analyzing the requirements of South Korea's COIN operations. COIN theory describes operational environment, insurgency, and the focal principles of COIN operations. Although there is no onesize-fits-all approach to COIN operations, a theory taken from one COIN campaign can be applied to another campaign. The South's own history with counterinsurgencies demonstrates the immutable nature of insurgency that transcends time and space. Operational art then includes the origin and evolution of operational art and its application to COIN.
Counterinsurgency
The nature of COIN, according to the US Government Counterinsurgency Guide, is dependent on the complex interaction of three key factors: "the characteristics of the environment in which it takes place; the nature of the insurgent group; and the nature of the counterinsurgent forces."
13 Within this context, it is worthwhile to explore the operational environment and then continue with a discussion of the insurgency and COIN theory.
Operational Environment
Operational environments, as defined in FM 3-0, are "a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander." 14 The increasingly complex nature of the COIN environment makes it difficult for counterinsurgents to cope with insurgent threats due to the interaction of a complex 23 An insurgent approach, as described above, differs from the others depending on its goal and condition. However, all insurgents need a common basic requirement for success: the support of the civilian population. Therefore, insurgents take strategic initiatives at the early stage and seek to evolve through a series of stages supported by the disaffected population. • Legitimacy is the main objective.
Nature of Counterinsurgency Effort
• Unity of effort is essential.
• Political factors are primary.
• Planners must understand the environment.
• Intelligence drives operations.
• Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support.
• Security under the rule of law is essential.
• Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment.
With regard to legitimacy, counterinsurgents can achieve effective governance through strengthen legitimate governance. Consequently, COIN needs to put a premium on political factors to achieve the end state. 27 The remaining five of the eight historical principles are related to environment, intelligence, and public support. As stated previously under operational environment, an effective COIN operation needs a heavy emphasis on knowledge of the environment where counterinsurgents conduct operations. Based on an understanding of the COIN environment, counterinsurgents seek to acquire intelligence to verify whether they are moving in the right direction. Intelligence plays a primary role in eliminating the root causes of insurgency. Moreover, as intelligence primarily stems from the populace, it is inevitable that counterinsurgents and insurgents will battle fiercely to gain public support. Therefore, counterinsurgents seek to isolate insurgents from the populace. 28 According to O'Neill, there are two types of public support:
passive and active support. Passive support means aid to insurgents through information acquired from people who quietly sympathize with them, while active support means that someone helps insurgents by providing safe havens, serving as liaison agents, and committing acts of civil disobedience. 29 Regardless of the type of support, it is of utmost importance to prevent insurgents from acquiring intelligence from the public. The key prescriptions are to protect the public security and address citizens' grievances so that counterinsurgents can win the hearts and minds of the people. 
South Korea's COIN History
The term insurgency is nothing new for South Koreans. Insurgencies have occurred regularly as part of the operating environment on the Korean Peninsula since ancient times. In fact, there have been numerous insurgencies related to political, social, religious, and ideological issues throughout Korean history. This section briefly describes four selected insurgencies that occurred for different reasons in different dynasties. These historical cases demonstrate the root causes of insurgency and how they influenced the subsequent events in Korean history.
The first case illustrates a conspiratorial approach linked to strife between different lineages of the royal classes. In Korea's ancient dynasty, bloodlines and relationships, both by family and position, to the political system determined the entire social power structure. As such, a person's position was decided even before birth, on the basis of heredity and occupation, for example, civil officials, soldiers, clerical workers, and artisans. 31 In the Unified Silla dynasty of the early ninth century, Kim Heon-chang, a provincial governor, led an insurgency for the construction of a new country, largely in response to the aristocratic rank system in the Silla dynasty. This system, called the bone rank system, was divided into three layers of sacred bone, true bone, and the head ranks on the basis of heredity. 32 Kim Heon-chang, with true bone status in the Unified Silla aristocratic class, was a direct descendant of King Muyeol, the 29th king of the many civil officials. As a result, military power groups seized control of the country by the end of the 12th century. 38 The third case demonstrates a protracted approach related to the complex reasons that drive political, religious, and social issues. It was called the Donghak Peasant Movement led by the peasant class protesting political corruption, the feudal system, and foreign influence on the Peninsula. 39 Throughout the 1800s, Korean peasants suffered from drought and floods that alternately struck the rice fields and farms of Korea. In addition, as the number of upper-class Yangban increased, the manual labor burden increasingly fell upon the peasants. Corrupt governors imposed increased taxes and unpaid labor on the starving farmers. It was provincial governor Jo Byong-gap's tyranny and corruption in Go-bu that ignited the Peasant Insurgency led by Jeon Bong-jun in 1894. 40 The insurgency began with the purpose of reforming the corrupt government and improving living conditions of the peasant. With the increased power of the Donghaks, the government requested the Qing dynasty to assist in quelling the insurgency. Qing sent troops to Joseon; Japan also dispatched troops, citing China's violation of the Convention of Tientsin, which led to the Sino-Japanese War on July 23, 1894. 41 Japan's victory in the war resulted in its intervention in Joseon's domestic politics, which triggered further insurgency on the Peninsula. Although the poorly armed peasants conducted a continuous insurgency by moving to various bases, the Donghaks were crushed by the government, which was supported by the Japanese Army.
The fourth case describes an identity-focused approach related to ideological conflicts. It is South Korea's COIN campaign against a communist-led uprising that occurred in 1948 on 38 Ibid., [156] [157] In the 1860s, it arose as a negation to the growing foreign influence in the Joseon Dynasty. There were several clashes involving the Americans and the French. The Joseon Dynasty opened the door to the West with the treaty of Ganghwa in 1876.
40 [406] [407] Ibid., 411.
Cheju Island, the largest island in the southernmost part of South Korea. Local insurgents had taken advantage of favorable conditions, primarily a lack of security forces, to use violence to instill fear in the population. The insurgency in Cheju-do had been sustained by support from North Korean communists who were attempting to gain control of the remote islands and create unrest in the South. The campaign led to the death of an estimated 30,000 people and expanded guerrilla warfare to other remote areas and small towns in the mountainous areas of the South. 
Operational Art
The genesis of operational art began in the pursuit of a linkage between tactical and strategic aims. Michael R. experts came to realize that a single tactical success couldn't translate into strategic success and the old framework of strategy and tactics was inadequate to comprehend the modern battlefield. 49 Shimon Naveh states that the 1986 edition of FM 100-5 was the "perceptional breakthrough" in American recognition of operational art since it "marked the definite recognition of creativity as the basic quality required from operational commanders."
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Matheny introduced three levels of war, as described in earlier Leavenworth texts from 1936: the conduct of war, strategy, and tactics. 51 The conduct of war encompasses not only the scope of the armed forces but also political and economic measures, while strategy was defined as 51 Michael R. Matheny, "The Roots of Modern American Operational Art." Below the description on three levels of war also refers to the same source. the art of concentrating superior combat power in a theater of war. Tactics was defined as the art of executing strategic movement prior to battle. The United States Army Field Manual 3-0
Operations describes the correlation between strategy, operational approach, and tactical actions, and stresses that tactical success is aimed at achieving the strategic objective. 52 In 2011, the U.S.
military refined Operational Art in ADP 3-0 as "the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose." political power. 62 The North's military has dominated political and economic institutions since Kim Jong-il adopted the Military First Policy as a guideline for domestic governance and foreign policy. 63 The North has used the military as a means of strengthening the Kim family's political power and resolving domestic political instability. In fact, Kim Jong-il emerged as a North Korean political figure through the Blue House raid and the USS Pueblo case in 1968. 64 There was North Korea's nuclear crisis in 1993 before the death of Kim Il-Sung. Moreover, provocative nuclear threats in 2009 and the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyong artillery attack in 2010 were deliberately intended to strengthen Kim Jong-un's political position in the process of power succession. 65 The transfer of power was allegedly the cause of these events.
North Korea is armed with nuclear weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, between $500 million and $1 billion annually from the narcotics trade. North Korea is thought to produce more than 40 tons of opium per year, which would make it the world's third-largest opium exporter and sixth-largest heroin exporter." 68 After the international community took measures against the regime's illicit financial activities, the North's economy began to suffer.
Despite that, North Korea still spends resources needed for civilian consumption on its military build-up. Under these circumstances, the regime's inefficient economic system could spur domestic unrest.
North Korea's economic problems have extended to social issues. The regime's strong control no longer frightens citizens at the crossroads of life and death. As the North loses control over its population, the illegal drug trade is becoming prevalent among ordinary citizens. The rules of money and power are also becoming commonplace rather than the rule of laws and regulations. While the North's officials bend the rules to make life better for themselves and their families, the regime becomes a corrupt society that relies on bribery. Moreover, diverse social problems such as drug trafficking, robbery, murder, and prostitution are growing in North Korea.
In particular, drug trafficking is a serious condition in the cities adjoining the Chinese border, such as Hoiryeong, Musan, and Sinuiju. This drug problem could damage the character of the North Korean people and further the expansion of criminal organizations and illegal armed forces.
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In addition, North Korea is notorious for its consistent disregard for basic human rights.
The U.S. Department of State describes human rights in North Korea in a Background Note:
"Reported human rights abuses include arbitrary and lengthy imprisonment, torture and degrading treatment, poor prison conditions, forced labor, public executions, prohibitions or severe restrictions on freedom of speech, the press, movement, assembly, religion, and privacy, denial of 68 Dick K. Nanto, "The North Korean Economy: Overview and Policy Analysis," CRS Report for Congress (18 April, 2007) http://www.nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/reports/07045CRS.pdf (accessed 27 September). 
Character of North Korea's Military
North Korea's past provocations exemplify how much North Korea relied on physical violence to create an unstable condition on the Korean Peninsula. The North has been responsible for almost all terrorism-related acts against the Korean people since 1958. 74 The most common types of terrorist tactics used against South Korea have included bombing, shooting, and hijacking. 75 Another aspect of the North's physical violence is guerrilla infiltration. conditions. Within this context, there is a high possibility of an insurgency that may stem from the public grievances associated with political, economic, and social issues.
As the Northern regime's structure is illegitimate and fragile, it may not properly function once it loses control of the population. PMESII analysis shows that a successful revolt would be likely to incite a mass uprising and have a ripple effect on the expansion of insurgency across North Korea. Therefore, South Korea needs to prepare for such a situation and devise measures to 78 Stars and Stripes, "USFK commander takes war cue from Iraq," (29 June, 2007), http://www.stripes.com/news/usfk-commander-takes-war-cue-from-iraq-1.80485 (accessed 19 September 2011). General Sharp said, "I do believe that North Korea is taking lessons out of Iraq, and they will change and adapt tactics. I greatly worry about IEDs showing up in this theater."
79 Misagh Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000) , 19-25. address problems on the basis of expected strategy, strategic objectives, and tactics of the North insurgency described above.
Functional Area Analysis (FAA): Required Capabilities
In case of the collapse of the North, the South may face the following complex challenges derived from the interaction of various root causes of the insurgency and strategic context.
• How to control the massive influx of Northern defectors into the South • When to intervene to avoid chaos or "anarchy" in the North • How to seize WMDs command and control ahead of an insurgency • How to deal with a hybrid threat of conventional and unconventional weapons • How to separate insurgents from the public and gain public support in the North • How to cope with Chinese external support to insurgents Understanding the operational environment and the character of the North enables us to predict possible political objectives, strategies, and tactics of a Northern insurgency. The political objective of the insurgents would likely be to throw out Kim Jong-un and his regime and become the leading power in North Korea. If the South and its coalition partners intervene to prevent chaotic disorder that may endanger security on the Peninsula, insurgents might pursue the following strategy:
• Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative through WMDs control • Bleed South Korea and its coalition partners to exhaustion and force them to withdraw • Provoke the South and contain coalition partners through external support from China Thus the South needs to increase its integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability to gain a relative advantage over a Northern insurgency, especially the North's WMDs facilities as well as its conventional capabilities. In addition, it requires military and nonmilitary resources to counter provocative and protracted conflicts that the Northern insurgency would use to exhaust the South. Further, it is significant that South Korea needs the support of coalition partners to cope with Chinese external support, as well as its diplomatic efforts with China. To achieve strategic objectives, the Northern insurgents might rely heavily on their hybrid capabilities, which would support the following tactics:
• Provocation: execute provocative events against the South in order to cause the South's overreaction and create instability.
• Intimidation: intimidate and kill people who are willing to help the South and its coalition partners in order to prevent the populace from cooperating with counterinsurgents.
• Protraction: prolong the conflict in order to exhaust the South and its partners, erode their political will, and weaken their public support.
• Exhaustion: impose costs in terms of lives, resources, and political capital in order to convince the South that the war is not worth continuing.
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To counter a future Northern insurgency's tactics, it is necessary to use a combination of offensive and defensive operations. However, neither of these operations alone guarantees success in COIN. Nonmilitary elements can often be more effective components than military means to address the root causes of insurgency because COIN is a battle for gaining public support. And public support often depends on honest, up-to-date information to counter the insurgents' propaganda. Further, military actions alone can't achieve the COIN goal of "winning the hearts and minds of the population." While the South needs a military-centric approach to eliminate WMDs and cope with guerrilla and terrorism tactics, including IED attacks, it also needs a population-centric approach to address public grievances and isolate the populace from the insurgents.
U.S. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, describes the foundations of unified land operations as initiative, decisive action, army core competencies, and mission command. 81 To seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, the South's counterinsurgents would need to degrade the coherence of the North through the simultaneous combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations against a Northern insurgency with both conventional and hybrid threats. 82 Thus, combined arms maneuver and wide area security, described as U.S. Army core competencies in ADP 3-0, are helpful in defeating enemy forces and protecting populations, forces, and infrastructure. 83 In addition, mission command is required to empower agile and adaptive leaders who can anticipate and adapt quickly to changing conditions in a fluid mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations. Given that the nature of the COIN environment is complex and ambiguous, the most important factors for COIN success are information and time. As adaptive insurgents with initial operational initiatives decide when, where, and how they fight, denying information to counterinsurgents, it is important for counterinsurgents to acquire the information necessary to react quickly. Moreover, as the Northern military's guerrilla warfare and terrorism may be primary tactics, the roles of small-unit leaders on the ground would be critical factors to successful COIN operations in terms of time-sensitive decision making.
Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA): Gap-Filling Solutions
With some of the potential challenges now identified, the monograph will examine potential doctrine, organization, and leadership and education solutions of the DOTMLPF that can affect counterinsurgency requirements for South Korea. In the area of doctrine, this examination specifically addresses the value of incorporating operational art and design into the South's doctrinal constructs. In the area of organizational solutions, the monograph studies 89 Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (St. Petersburg Florida: Hailer Publishing, 1966 republished 2005 , 55.
implementation of a "whole-of-government" approach for unity of effort between armed services and other agencies. Finally, the leadership and education aspect focuses on the application of mission command.
Doctrine: Operational Art and Design
Clausewitz points out, "War has its own grammar, but not its own logic." 90 In South
Korea's COIN, logic refers to immutable political intent that counterinsurgents and insurgents pursue, while grammar indicates mutable ways and means to achieve political intent on both sides. In this regard, it is important to understand the relation of the military to national policy for achieving strategic goals. Insurgency, by definition, intends to achieve political aims through tactical actions. Thus South Korea needs to present a clear political objective so that military forces can seek strategic aims by arranging tactical actions that fit into time, space, and purpose.
Clausewitz also postulates that nations go to war for one logical reason: "to perform an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." 91 North Korea's insurgency will attempt to it is important to isolate individual elements within the insurgency system from each other to deter the effect of synchronization. However, what matters most is achieving strategic aims through the efficient arrangement of tactical actions, rather than winning a series of separate victories on the tactical level.
Gaddis warns planners not to seek a solution from singular causes or independent variables, but to seek a solution interrelated to variables.
92 Without directing strategic objectives, independent victories at tactical levels do not necessarily translate into success at strategic levels.
Thus it is necessary for counterinsurgents to look a few steps ahead, beyond the battle itself.
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Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence, defines operational art as "the intermediated area between tactics and strategy." 94 The levels of war correlate to specific levels of planning, and they help organize thought and approaches to a problem. 95 Therefore successful counterinsurgency depends largely upon an effective application of operational art for linking strategic levels and tactical levels, which will lead to desired success at national levels.
To cope with unpredictable and complex challenges that lie ahead, the South Korean
Army also needs to consider the application of design methodology. Design, as defined in FM 5-0
The Operations Process, is "a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to the Korean Peninsula. Addressing conventional threats is a relatively well-structured problem because the South has prepared for this type of war since the division of the two Koreas and is well aware of operational environment, problems, and operational approach.
Conversely, the South's COIN operations require an understanding of ill-structured problems gained by applying their knowledge, experience, and insight. Bryan Lawson, the author of How Designers Think, argues that "design is as much a matter of finding problems as it is of solving them."
97 He stresses the importance of identifying problems to avoid an unnecessary iterative process from formulating to moving. South Korea also needs a creative and adaptive approach to reduce uncertainty and chaos in order to cope with the Northern insurgency.
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Because both the insurgents and the counterinsurgents will seek to win the hearts and minds of the public, it is important to create a unique approach that makes the two sides' approaches different. This requires creative thinking, which will lead to outmaneuvering the enemy. Thus, the problem South Korea should solve is 'how to win the hearts and minds ahead of insurgents,' rather than just 'winning the hearts and minds of the public.' The former means 'how to gain a relative advantage over the enemy,' while the latter means 'how to go my own way as planned regardless of the enemy.'
As war is a matter of two conflicting opponents or opposing wills, the first reciprocal approach is more appropriate, although it makes a situation more unpredictable. In particular, both sides will struggle to predict the result of conflicts between the two sides' unique approaches, trying to stay ahead of each other. In addition, ill-structured problems derive from the 'no front' hybrid warfare is a competition over a route that is not designated, so that speed is not necessarily a decisive factor. Thus designers need to rely on creative thinking more than planners who mostly develop a well-structured plan on the basis of a pre-planned Operations Plan (OPLAN) or Standing Operation Procedure (SOP).
The South Korean military thus needs to apply design methodology to COIN and educate military designers in its potential application. They can then create unique approaches to outmaneuver a North Korean insurgency and win popular support. Given the complexity of the COIN environment, design methodology is necessary to avoid an unnecessary iterative process that involves formulating problems and setting corrective action in motion while complementing the role of MDMP in the planning process. Therefore, operational art and design methodology will fill a doctrinal gap and lead to strategic success in COIN operations. Kilcullen points out that unity of effort can be achieved through "a common strategic understanding and a common best practice." 101 A common strategic understanding allows us to pursue strategic objectives, while a common best practice leads to tactical success. Hoffman argues that a comprehensive COIN needs "a clear strategy, a defined structure for implementing it, and a vision for inter-government agency cooperation and the unified effort to guide it. uncertain environment is being confronted with hybrid threats that characterize combinations of regular and irregular groups. In particular, an insurgency or terrorism where there is no clear front will increase uncertainty due to lack of information, which would make it difficult to respond to a situation quickly. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency states that Mission Command is ideally suited to the mosaic nature of COIN operations, as leaders at lower units better understand a situation on the ground and can make a decision properly.
Organization: Unity of Effort
106 Van Creveld also states that an organization may react in either of two ways to carry out a mission when the information available is less than needed to perform the mission: One is to increase its information-processing capacity; the other is to design tasks that enable it to operate on the basis of less information. 107 FM 6-0 describes two solutions for reducing uncertainty: an information-focused solution and an action-focused solution. 108 While the first tends to focus on processing more information at the higher units, the latter allows subordinates to delegate authority to the lower units that can deal with the information. The information-focused approach increases uncertainty at lower units, but an action-focused one enables subordinate units to make decisions on their own and offer flexibility and agility. Thus the South needs to decentralize capabilities and operations in order to effectively counter decentralized insurgents by reducing the amount of data processing required. Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian General Staff in 1857, applied the mission-oriented command system stressing decentralized initiative within an overall strategic design. He based his choice on understanding that the command method encourages the initiative of subordinates and facilitates effective tactical operations under mission command. 109 Mission command grants freedom for subordinate leaders at all levels to exercise disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to outmaneuver the insurgents in cognitive and physical space.
Conclusions
This monograph described a common conceptual understanding of COIN theory and doctrine and South Korea's COIN imperatives using a capability-based assessment. Through analysis of the strategic context, it identified the necessity of preparation for COIN in case of a collapse in the North. Functional Area Analysis (FAA) illustrated the required capability, while
Functional Need Analysis (FNA) identified the capability gap. Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) provided broad 'gap-filling solutions.' It is important to create a learning organization and a culture that promotes the learning of operational art, unity of effort, and mission command to 107 Martin Van Creveld, 269. 108 FM 6-0, 1-11.
109 Ibid., [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] succeed in COIN operations and adapt to a complex and complicated COIN environment. The South Korean Army also needs to devote time and effort to developing a new COIN doctrine suited to the COIN environment it may face. In addition, it needs to consider reorganizing the appropriate force structure in preparation for COIN operations while maintaining current conventional warfare approaches in the face of North Korea's hybrid threats.
Since the Korean War, the South Korean Army has been playing a significant role in both conventional and unconventional operations. General Sir Rupert Smith states that future wars will be war among the people, and they will fight in an ill-defined operational environment. 110 COIN operations will be more army-centric and rely less on other services because they deal with interaction between people and territorially centered operations. In this regard, the Army in South
Korea will be the primary arm of the COIN forces, in keeping with COIN's principles of the population primacy. Therefore, the South's Army needs an understanding of operational art and design that will enable it to link strategy and tactics and address ill-structured problems through creative and critical thinking. The Korean Army also should recognize its role as part of the government's all-encompassing approach so that it can achieve unity of effort. This comprehensive approach, combining all elements of national power, is paramount to success.
Moreover, the Army needs to decentralize command authority to outmaneuver the insurgents through operational adaptability.
What follows is a recommendation for the successful execution of COIN operations on the peninsula. Operational thinking, as defined in Systems Thinking, is "an ingenious way to overcome the difficulties encountered in constructing and simulating complex mental models." This monograph describes a Doctrine, Organization, and Leadership and Education solution approach to mitigate the gaps between the current capability and needed capability. The realization of these three elements is critical to success in the South's COIN; it should be followed by the South's review of Training, Material, Personnel, and Facility solution approaches.
Training should emphasize a seamless transition from combined arms maneuver to wide area security. Material requirements should include considerations such as budgets and equipment required in COIN operations, along with the non-military aspects in concert with government organizations. In addition, COIN experts who will play a significant role in COIN operations need to be better educated. Training sites and facilities for COIN operations should also be developed to build a better base of knowledge for the South Korean military to execute COIN operations.
